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MAGNUSON-STEVENS FISHERY CONSERVATION AND MANAGEMENT ACT 
I. Historical Background of Fisheries Management in the United States 
 The Magnuson-Stevens Fishery Conservation and Management Act (MSA) is the 
primary governing law for fisheries management in the United States.
1
  The MSA, as it is known 
today, evolved from state regulations and a series of national examinations of the management of 
fisheries in the United States.  Over the years, the MSA has seen several amendments and 
continues to be the subject of contentious debate and litigation in response to rapidly evolving 
information and policy objectives. 
a. Before the Magnuson-Stevens Act 
 Historically, U.S. fisheries were managed by an array of state regulations that primarily 
focused on fishing gear restrictions.
2
  Federal trade and ship-licensing laws also had an impact on 
fisheries in the early 1800s.
3
  As early as 1870, the federal government became directly involved 
with fisheries management through the development of the U.S. Commission on Fish and 
Fisheries.
4
  However, the states retained management of coastal fisheries, while “the commission 
itself focused most of its attention on discovering new stocks of fish, developing innovative 
fishing technology, and promoting fish sales.”5 
 The U.S. Commission on Fish and Fisheries was moved around different U.S. 
departments, first to the Department of Commerce in 1903,
6
 then to the Department of the 
Interior in 1939.
7
  In 1953, Congress passed the Submerged Lands Act, which granted coastal 
                                                 
1
 See Magnuson-Stevens Fishery Conservation and Management Act, 16 U.S.C. §§ 1801-1891(d) (2007). 
2
 JOSH EAGLE, ET AL., TAKING STOCK OF THE REGIONAL FISHERY MANAGEMENT COUNCILS 8 (2003). 
3
 EAGLE, ET AL., supra note 2, at 8. 
4
 Id. at 9. 
5
 Id. 
6
 Id.  Under the Department of Commerce, the Commission was renamed the U.S. Bureau of Fisheries. 
7
 Id.  Under the Department of the Interior, the Commission became a division of the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service. 
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states the authority to regulate fishing activities within three miles of the shore.
8
  Several years 
later in 1970, President Richard Nixon created the National Oceanic and Atmospheric 
Administration (NOAA) in the Department of Commerce, which provided for the federal 
management of fisheries under the National Marine Fisheries Service (NMFS).
9
   
 b. Enactment of the Magnuson-Stevens Act 
After its creation, NMFS initially focused on finding ways to help states implement better 
fisheries management plans in order to more effectively control coastal fish stocks.
10
  Of 
particular concern was the threat to coastal fish stocks from “massive foreign fishing fleets in 
waters adjacent to [] coastal areas,” which contributed to fish stock damage and interfered with 
domestic fishing efforts.
11
  Led by Senator Warren Magnuson, Congress passed the Fishery 
Conservation and Management Act in 1976,
12
 which declared a Fishery Conservation Zone 
(FCZ) that extended from state seaward boundaries (generally three miles offshore) to 200 miles 
offshore.
 13
  In 1980, the act was retitled the Magnuson Fishery Conservation and Management 
Act in recognition of Senator Magnuson‟s leadership.14  In 1996 the Act was given its current 
name, the Magnuson-Stevens Fishery Conservation and Management Act (Magnuson-Stevens 
Act or MSA), which reflected Senator Ted Stevens‟ contributions to the 1996 MSA 
amendments.
15
   
 
                                                 
8
 See Submerged Lands Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 1301-3015 (2000).  The seaward boundaries of Texas, Puerto Rico, and 
the Gulf coast of Florida extend nine nautical miles seaward of the shore.  United States v. Florida, 363 U.S. 121 
(1960); United States v. Louisiana, 363 U.S. 1 (1960). 
9
 EAGLE, ET AL., supra note 2, at 10. 
10
 Id. 
11
 16 U.S.C. § 1801(a)(3) (2007). 
12
 94 Pub. L. No. 265, 90 Stat. 331 (1976).   
13
 See Magnuson-Stevens Fishery Conservation and Management Act, 16 U.S.C. §§ 1801-1891(d) (2007). 
14
 96 Pub. L. No. 561, 94 Stat. 3275 (1980). 
15
 104 Pub. L. No. 208, 110 Stat. 3009 (1996). 
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 In its original 1976 draft, the MSA excluded foreign fishing fleets from U.S. waters, and 
encouraged the development and management of U.S. fisheries.
16
  The U.S. claimed exclusive 
authority to manage and regulate all marine life within the FCZ, except “birds, marine mammals, 
and highly migratory species of tuna.”17  In 1983, the MSA was amended to reflect President 
Ronald Reagan‟s proclamation that established an Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ), extending 
200 miles seaward from shore in accordance with Part VI of the United Nations Convention on 
the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS).
18
  Since 1976, the MSA has been amended several times in 
response to increased scientific knowledge and evolving policy goals. 
 c. Amendments to the Magnuson-Stevens Act 
One of the first major amendments to the MSA occurred in 1990 when tuna and other 
highly migratory species were brought within U.S. management authority under the MSA.
19
  
While the MSA could have originally been interpreted and implemented in a more conservation-
oriented manner, “the goal was to build domestic fisheries with a focus on efficiency and 
economic growth."
20
  After continuous signs of decreasing fish stocks, marine conservation 
groups insisted that the MSA be amended in order to better protect the fisheries.
21
   
In 1996, Congress passed the Sustainable Fisheries Act, amending the MSA and shifting 
its goals from a policy focused on the fishing industry, to a policy that made fishery conservation 
and ecosystem protection its primary purpose.
22
  The most recent amendment to the MSA 
occurred on January 12, 2007, when President Bush signed the Magnuson-Stevens Fishery 
                                                 
16
 See Magnuson-Stevens Fishery Conservation and Management Act, 16 U.S.C. §§ 1801-1891(d) (2007). 
17
 JOSEPH J. KALO, ET AL., COASTAL AND OCEAN LAW 513 (3d ed. 2002). 
18
 Presidential Proclamation No. 5030, 48 Fed. Reg. 10601 (Mar. 11, 1983). 
19
 KALO, ET AL., supra note 17 at 514. 
20
 NOAA Fisheries Service, Statement from the Director: President Bush Signs Magnuson-Stevens Fishery 
Conservation and Management Reauthorization Act of 2006, available at 
http://www.nmfs.noaa.gov/mediacenter/docs/Director_Statement_011207.pdf (last visited Oct. 22, 2010) 
[hereinafter Statement]. 
21
 DONALD C. BAUR, ET AL., OCEAN AND COASTAL LAW AND POLICY 280 n.67-68 (2007). 
22
 Id. at 280 n.66. 
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Conservation and Management Reauthorization Act of 2006.
23
  Under the latest amendment, the 
MSA called for an immediate end to overfishing through the use of annual catch limits and 
accountability measures, encouraged market-based fishery management through limited access 
privilege programs, and mandated increased international cooperation.
24
 
II. Structure of the Magnuson-Stevens Act   
a. Eight Regional Fishery Management Councils 
In order to conserve and manage fish stocks and essential fish habitats, the Magnuson-
Stevens Act established eight Regional Fishery Management Councils (Councils).
25
  Each 
Council is charged with creating a Fishery Management Plan (FMP), holding public hearings in 
order to allow interested persons a chance to comment on the development of the FMPs, and 
setting annual catch limits for each fishery within its region.
26
  The number of members on each 
Council generally depends upon the number of states and U.S. territories bordering the managed 
area, although certain Councils are subject to exceptions.
27
 
Each Council consists of voting and nonvoting members;
28
 voting members are further 
characterized as “required” or “appointed” members.29  Required Council members include the 
state official in charge of marine fishery management in each coastal state, as well as a NMFS 
regional director for the geographic area within the Council‟s jurisdiction.30  However, if there is 
more than one NMFS director within a Council‟s jurisdiction, the Secretary of Commerce 
                                                 
23
 Statement, supra note 20. 
24
 16 U.S.C. §§ 1852(h)(5)-(7), 1854(e)(3) (2007). 
25
 Id. § 1852(a)(1).  The eight Regional Fishery Management Councils include: New England Council, Mid-Atlantic 
Council, South Atlantic Council, Caribbean Council, Gulf Council, Pacific Council, North Pacific Council, and 
Western Pacific Council.  Id.  
26
 Id. § 1852(h)(1), (3), (6). 
27
 Id. § 1852(a)(1).   
28
 Id. § 1852(b), (c). 
29
 Id. § 1852(b)(1). 
30
 16 U.S.C. § 1852(b)(1)(A), (B) (2007). 
5 
 
(Secretary) decides which one will serve as the Council‟s voting member.31  In addition to the 
state and federal officials, coastal state governors may nominate citizens to the Council based on 
their knowledge regarding the conservation and management, or commercial or recreational 
harvest, of fish stocks within the Council‟s geographic area.32  The Secretary then decides 
whether the nominated citizens will become “appointed” members.33   
Nonvoting members on each Council include representatives from the U.S. Fish and 
Wildlife Service, U.S. Coast Guard, Marine Fisheries Commission, and U.S. Department of 
State.
34
  The Pacific Council also has one nonvoting member who is appointed by the Governor 
of Alaska.
35
   
Each regional Council is required to create a scientific and statistical committee to help 
with the “development, collection, evaluation, and peer review” of information that may be used 
by the Council to develop and amend a management plan.
36
  Similarly, each Council must form a 
fishing industry advisory committee to provide advice and assistance for the development of 
fishery management plans and amendments.
37
  In addition to these two required advisory 
committees, Councils may establish other advisory committees, if needed, to fulfill their duties 
under the MSA
38
  While the fishing industry “dominates all the nonscientific advisory groups, [] 
the ultimate management decisions remain with Council members themselves.”39   
 
                                                 
31
 Id. § 1852(b)(1)(B). 
32
 Id. § 1852(b)(2)(A). 
33
 Id. § 1852(b)(2)(A).  Appointed members “must be individuals who, by reason of their occupational or other 
experience, scientific expertise, or training, are knowledgeable regarding the conservation and management, or the 
commercial or recreational harvest, of the fishery resources of the geographical area concerned.”  Id. 
34
 Id. § 1852(c)(1). 
35
 Id. § 1852(c)(2). 
36
 16 U.S.C. § 1852(g)(1)(A) (2007). 
37
 Id. § 1852(g)(3)(A). 
38
 Id. § 1852(g)(2). 
39
 EAGLE, ET AL., supra note 2, at 16. 
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III. Management Under the Magnuson-Stevens Act   
a. Overall Management Scheme: FMPs, PMPs, and GIFAs 
 Under the MSA, Councils prepare Fishery Management Plans (FMPs) for each fishery 
within their respective jurisdiction that “requires conservation and management.”40  FMPs are 
used to “prevent overfishing and rebuild overfished stocks, and to protect, restore, and promote 
the long-term health and stability of [] [fisheries].”41  Once a Council has developed the FMP or 
amendment for domestic and foreign fishing within a particular fishery, the Secretary must then 
approve, disapprove, or partially approve the FMP.
42
  
If a foreign nation requests a permit to fish in an area without any FMP, the Secretary 
may prepare a Preliminary Fishery Management Plan (PMP) to cover such foreign fishing 
activities.
43
  Governing International Fishery Agreements (GIFAs) may be negotiated between 
the Secretary and foreign nations requesting to fish within the U.S. EEZ, which then must be 
ratified by Congress.
44
  When a Council fails to develop a needed FMP, the Secretary may 
prepare the FMP, in which case it will cover both domestic and foreign fishing.
45
  
b. Magnuson-Stevens Act Ten “National Standards” 
 The preparation and implementation of FMPs must be consistent with ten “national 
standards” (National Standards) set out in the MSA as follows: (1) prevent overfishing and 
achieve optimum yield for each fishery; (2) use the “best scientific information available”; (3) 
manage fish stocks as units and coordinate with other Councils to manage stocks within multiple 
jurisdictions; (4) allocate fishing privileges in a “fair and equitable” manner; (5) efficiently 
                                                 
40
 16 U.S.C. § 1853(a)(1)(A) (2007). 
41
 Id. § 1853(a)(1)(A). 
42
 Id. § 1854(a)(3). 
43
 Id. § 1821(g). 
44
 Id. § 1821(c). 
45
 Id. § 1854(c)(1).  Fisheries that are currently managed by the Secretary include the “Atlantic swordfish, Atlantic 
sharks, and Atlantic billfish”; “the Western Atlantic bluefin tuna fishery is managed under the [MSA] and the 
Atlantic Tunas Convention Act.” DENNIS W. NIXON, ET AL., MARINE AND COASTAL LAW 305, 306 (2d ed. 2010). 
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manage fisheries without solely focusing on economic allocation; (6) allow flexibility for future 
changes that may affect conservation and management; (7) minimize costs and “avoid 
unnecessary duplication”; (8) consider the needs of fishing communities, encourage community 
participation, and “minimize adverse economic impacts on such communities”; (9) “to the extent 
practicable,” minimize bycatch and the mortality of unavoidable bycatch; and (10) “to the extent 
practicable . . . promote the safety of human life at sea.”46 
 c. Provisions of Fishery Management Plans 
 In addition to meeting the ten National Standards, the MSA requires specific information, 
management objectives, and provisions to be included in each Councils‟ FMPs.  The MSA 
breaks down the FMP regulations into “required provisions”47 and “discretionary provisions,”48 
and provides for specific deadlines
49
 and “limited access privilege programs” (LAPPs).50  As 
discussed in Part III(c)(i), the 2006 amendments made significant changes to FMP requirements 
in order to more effectively conserve and manage fisheries. 
i. Required Provisions 
 Every FMP is required to contain specific information about the fishery for which the 
FMP has been established, including economic, biological, and ecological information.  A 
description of the fishery should include, but is not limited to, the fish species, the number of 
vessels used, the type of fishing gear used, management costs, actual and potential revenues from 
the fishery, trends in landings, recreational and commercial interest in the fishery, and whether 
foreign fishing or Indian treaty fishing occurs for the particular species involved.
51
  FMPs that 
                                                 
46
 16 U.S.C. § 1851 (a)(1)-(10) (2007). 
47
 Id. § 1853(a). 
48
 Id. § 1853(b). 
49
 Id. § 1853 note. 
50
 Id. §§ 1853(a)(13), 1853a. 
51
 Id. § 1853(a)(2). 
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are submitted to the Secretary for approval must “specify the nature and extent of scientific data 
which is needed for effective implementation.”52  The essential fish habitat for the fishery must 
be identified and described, and the FMP must “minimize to the extent practicable adverse 
effects on such habitat caused by fishing.”53 
 Another requirement for FMPs is that Councils must “assess and specify” the maximum 
sustainable yield and optimum yield for the fishery, and include details about how those yields 
were established.
54
  For each FMP, a fishery impact statement must be submitted to the Secretary 
and include the “cumulative conservation, economic, and social impacts, of the conservation and 
management measures” on fishery participants and communities, adjacent fisheries, and the 
safety of fishermen.
55
  Also, in accordance with National Standard one, objective and measurable 
criteria must be included in the FMP to determine when the fishery is overfished, how to prevent 
or end overfishing, and how to rebuild the fishery.
56
  The criteria used to make these 
determinations must be supported by scientific data.
57
  
 FMPs must minimize the bycatch and the mortality of bycatch within a fishery “to the 
extent practicable.”58  Councils must develop a “standardized reporting methodology” for 
bycatch
59
 and determine the mortality of fish caught by catch-and-release.
60
  This provision was 
added to the MSA in the 1996 amendments, as was the provision requiring the minimization of 
impacts of fishing and fishing gear on essential fish habitat.
61
  Both amendments were intended 
to remedy past failures of Councils to properly manage fish stocks, although the language “to the 
                                                 
52
 16 U.S.C. § 1853(a)(8) (2007). 
53
 Id. § 1853(a)(7). 
54
 Id. § 1853(a)(3). 
55
 Id. § 1853(a)(9). 
56
 Id. § 1853(a)(10). 
57
 Id. 
58
 16 U.S.C. § 1853(a)(11) (2007). 
59
 Id. 
60
 Id. § 1853(a)(12). 
61
 BAUR, ET AL., supra note 21, at 282 n.98.  
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extent practicable” still provides flexibility.62  As discussed in Part V(b), Councils have used this 
language in order to “avoid gear restrictions or area closures that would be unpopular among 
members of the fishing community, whether such measures might be „practicable‟ or not.”63 
 When the MSA was most recently amended in 2006, Congress sought to prevent 
Councils from delaying proper management by requiring Councils, beginning in 2009, to “end 
overfishing immediately.”64  Now, Councils must establish annual catch limits for U.S. 
commercial and recreational fisheries subject to overfishing by 2010, and for all other stocks by 
2011.
65
  Councils must also have measures to ensure accountability with these limits, and annual 
catch limits “may not exceed the fishing level recommendations of [a Council‟s] scientific and 
statistical committee.”66   
 In 2009, NMFS published guidelines for the 2006 amendments in the Federal Register, 
which “outline a system of catch limits, reference points and targets that can be used for each 
stock to prevent overfishing.”67  This system mandates strong accountability measures and 
provides for scientific uncertainty when determining catch limits for a stock.
68
  Fishermen have 
expressed their fears that the 2006 amendments are overly restrictive, based on inadequate 
scientific data, and may result in the closure of popular fish species.
 69
  While the strict legal 
mandates in the 2006 amendments seek to finally achieve the MSA objectives of ending 
                                                 
62
 See id. 
63
 BAUR, ET AL., supra note 21, at 282 (citing Pac. Marine Conservation Council, Inc. v. Evans, 200 F. Supp. 2d 
1194 (N.D. Cal. 2002).   
64
 16 U.S.C. § 1854(e)(3) (2007). 
65
 Id. §§ 1853(a)(15), 1853 note (1)(A),(B). 
66
 Id. § 1852(h)(6). 
67
 National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration, NOAA Issues Final Guidance on Annual Catch Limits to End 
Overfishing, http://www.noaanews.noaa.gov/stories2009/20090115_endoverfishing.html (last visited Oct. 11, 2010) 
[hereinafter NOAA Final Guidance]; 74 Fed. Reg. 11 (Jan. 16, 2009). 
68
 Id. 
69
 NOAA Final Guidance, supra note 67. 
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overfishing, fishermen are concerned that such an objective may only be feasible by completely 
closing certain fisheries.
70
 
  ii. Discretionary Provisions and Limited Access Privilege Programs (LAPP) 
 In addition to the many FMP requirements, Councils have the authority to take other 
discretionary measures to conserve and manage fisheries.  For example, Councils may require 
fishing vessels within U.S. jurisdiction, or fish processors receiving fish under an FMP, to obtain 
a fishing permit from the Secretary.
71
  Furthermore, Councils may limit fishermen to certain 
areas and types of vessels or gear used,
72
 establish a “limited access system” for fishermen in 
order to achieve optimum yield,
73
 and require fisheries observers aboard fishing vessels in order 
to collect scientific data.
74
 
  Under the 2006 amendments, another discretionary measure left to Councils is whether to 
manage a fishery by using a limited access privilege program (LAPP).
75
  A LAPP allows a 
Council to allocate to “individual fishermen (or vessel owners) the privilege of catching a 
percentage share of the total amount of fish made available to the fishery each year.”76  LAPP 
shares are not considered property, but rather are considered “a grant of permission” to the 
shareholder to “engage in activities permitted by such limited access privilege or quota share.”77   
Any Council utilizing LAPPs in a fishery that is overfished or subject to a rebuilding 
plan, must ensure that the LAPPs will assist in its rebuilding; similarly, for a fishery that is over-
capacity, the LAPP must help reduce capacity.
78
  The LAPP must generally promote safety, 
                                                 
70
 Id. 
71
 16 U.S.C. § 1853(b)(1) (2007). 
72
 Id. § 1853(b)(2). 
73
 Id. § 1853(b)(6). 
74
 Id. § 1853(b)(8). 
75
 Id. § 1853a(a). 
76
 BAUR, ET AL., supra note 21, at 283. 
77
 16 U.S.C. § 1853a(b)(5) (2007). 
78
 Id. § 1853a(c)(1)(A),(B). 
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conservation and management, as well as social and economic benefits of the fishery.
79
  In 
addition, all LAPPs must provide for fishery monitoring and enforcement,
80
 fish processing on 
U.S. vessels or soil,
81
 an appeals process for initial allocation decisions,
82
 and a system for 
collecting information to determine whether “illegal acts of anti-competition, anti-trust, price 
collusion, or price fixing have occurred.”83   
 Deciding allocation shares can be a difficult and controversial process.  In developing a 
LAPP, Councils must use a procedure that is fair and equitable for allocating initial shares.
84
  
According to a technical memorandum issued by NMFS in November, 2007, “[t]wo important 
objectives of an initial allocation procedure are that it should be as administratively simple as 
possible and it should rely on generally available and transparent data.”85  The Council “should 
consider the cultural and social framework of the fishery.”86  One of the issues that can arise in 
LAPPs with transferable shares is a fear that share ownership might become monopolized by a 
few fishermen, while excluding others.  Although the MSA requires conservation and 
management measures to be “carried out in such manner that no particular individual, 
corporation, or other equity acquires an excessive share of such privileges,” the MSA fails to 
define “excessive share.”87 
 
IV. Most Recent Status of U.S. Fisheries 
                                                 
79
 Id. § 1853a(c)(1)(C). 
80
 Id. § 1853a(c)(1)(G), (H). 
81
 Id. § 1853a(c)(1)(E). 
82
 Id. § 1853a(c)(1)(I). 
83
 16 U.S.C. § 1853a(c)(1)(J) (2007). 
84
 Id. § 1853a(c)(5)(A). 
85
 National Marine Fisheries Services, The Design and Use of Limited Access Privilege Programs at 60, available at 
http://www.nmfs.noaa.gov/sfa/PartnershipsCommunications/lapp/design_and_useLAPs2007.pdf (last visited, Oct. 
22, 2010). 
86
 Id. 
87
 16 U.S.C. § 1851(a)(4) (2007). 
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 a. NMFS 2009 Status of U.S. Fisheries Report 
 Every year, NMFS is required to report the status of U.S. fisheries to Congress and the 
eight regional Councils.
88
  The 2009 report was based on the most current stock assessments as 
of December 31, 2009.
89
  Fish stocks are assessed using “the best available scientific information 
and status determination criteria specified in a fishery management plan.”90  NMFS assesses 
stocks according to standards prepared by the regional Councils; thus, the success of each 
Council is assessed using the goals the Councils set for themselves.
91
   
 Fish stocks are assessed using the terms “overfishing” and “overfished.”  Overfishing 
refers to “a stock that . . . has a fishing mortality (harvest) rate above the level that provides for 
the maximum sustainable yield.”92  Overfished refers to “a stock that has a biomass level below a 
biological threshold specified in its fishery management plan.”93  Both terms indicate that fish 
mortality is at a level that prevents a fishery from producing “the maximum sustainable yield on 
a continuing basis.”94 
 Of the 522 stocks assessed in 2009, 250 stocks have a known overfishing status, while 
272 stocks have overfishing thresholds that are either not defined, not applicable, or are 
unknown.
95
  This means that the status of approximately 52% of the stocks is currently 
unknown.
96
  Of the 250 stocks that have a known status, 15% are currently subject to 
                                                 
88
 Id. § 1851(e)(1). 
89
 National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration, National Marine Fisheries Service, 2009 Status of U.S. 
Fisheries, http://www.nmfs.noaa.gov/sfa/statusoffisheries/sos_full28_press.pdf at 1 (last visited Oct. 11, 2010) 
[hereinafter Status of Fisheries]. 
90
 Id. 
91
 EAGLE, ET AL., supra note 2, at 17. 
92
 Status of Fisheries, supra note 89, at 1. 
93
 Id. 
94
 16 U.S.C. § 1802(34) (2007). 
95
 Status of Fisheries, supra note 89, at 5. 
96
 Id. 
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overfishing.
97
  Slightly more stocks have a known overfished status, 23%, while 319 stocks have 
overfished thresholds that are either not defined, not applicable, or are unknown.
98
  Compared to 
the 2008 NMFS report, the percentage of stocks subject to overfishing decreased by 1% in 
2009,
99
 and the percentage of overfished stocks remained the same.
100
 
The 1% decrease in stocks subject to overfishing is because scup (Atlantic coast) and 
skate (Gulf of Maine) are no longer subject to overfishing; pink shrimp (Gulf of Mexico) was 
found to not be subject to overfishing because the previous assessment was invalid.
101
  
According to the 2009 report, no stocks were added to the list of stocks subject to overfishing.
102
   
Five stocks were found to no longer be considered overfished,
103
 while four other stocks 
were added to the overfished list.
104
  When considering this information, it is important to realize 
that a “stock cannot be considered „rebuilt‟ within the definition of the [MSA],” until the stock 
produces its maximum sustainable yield.
105
  Four stocks were found to be “fully rebuilt to 100% 
of their [biomass maximum sustainable yield] and four other stocks had biomass levels of at least 
80% of their maximum sustainable yield.
106
 
 
 
 
                                                 
97
 Id. 
98
 Id. 
99
 Id. at 1.  Thirty-eight stocks (15%) were subject to overfishing in 2009 compared to 41 stocks (16%) in 2008.  Id. 
100
 Id.  Forty-six stocks (23%) were overfished in both 2008 and in 2009, signifying no improvement.  Id.  
101
 Status of Fisheries, supra note 89, at 1. 
102
 Id. 
103
 Id.  The following stocks were found to no longer be overfished: scup (Atlantic coast), winter skate (Georges 
Bank/Southern New England), bocaccio (Southern Pacific coast), darkblotched rockfish (Pacific coast), and sailfish 
(Western Atlantic).  Id. 
104
 Id.  The following stocks were added to the overfished list in 2009: canary rockfish (Pacific coast), coho salmon 
(Washington coast), queets (Western Strait of Juan de Fuca), and petrale sole (Pacific coast).  Id. 
105
 EAGLE, ET AL., supra note 2, at 19. 
106
 Status of Fisheries, supra note 89, at 2.  Scup (Atlantic coast), Black sea bass (Mid-Atlantic coast), Blue king 
crab (St. Matthews Island), and Swordfish (North Atlantic), were found to have stocks fully rebuilt to 100% of their 
biomass maximum sustainable yield.  Id. 
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b. Economic Status and Landings of U.S. Fisheries 
The most recent landings data available from NMFS indicates that a total of over 7.8 
billion pounds of fish were landed in the United States in 2009.  The total landings were valued 
at over $3.8 billion dollars.
107
 
The latest available information regarding fishery sales and jobs in the U.S. is from 2006.  
That year, “U.S. commercial and recreational fisheries generated more than $185 billion in sales 
and supported more than two million jobs nationwide.”108  The commercial fishing industry 
generated $103 billion in sales and supported 1.5 million jobs, including “harvesters, seafood 
processors and dealers, seafood wholesalers and seafood retailers.”109  Recreational saltwater 
fishing accounted for $82 billion in sales and supported 534,000 jobs in 2006.
110
 
V. Existing and Future Problems  
 Despite numerous amendments to the Magnuson-Stevens Act and a policy shift that 
currently focuses on conservation and management, the nation‟s fisheries are in trouble.  Many 
factors have contributed to declining fish stocks including inadequate, conflicting, and unclear 
provisions of the MSA.  The structure of federal fishery management under the MSA has been 
criticized for giving “too much authority to those with a financial interest in any resulting fishery 
regulation.”111  
 a. Structural Issues of the Regional Councils 
The eight regional councils are composed in large part of representatives from the fishing 
industry, resulting in a relatively homogenous group that is “less likely to produce well 
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considered decisions than groups with diverse membership.”112  When faced with difficult 
allocation decisions, Councils have the ability to limit conservation in order to increase catch 
limits.
113
  While NMFS is responsible for supervising the Councils, two studies showed that 
“[b]etween 1980 and 2000, NMFS partially disapproved only 62 of approximately 860 proposed 
plans, amendments, or annual specifications – resulting in a partial disapproval rate of 7 
percent.”114   
Another problem with the structure of the MSA is that the Councils are exempt from a 
number of federal laws that are “designed to promote beneficial regulation by ensuring objective 
officials, open public participation, and transparency in decision-making.”115  The 1996 
amendments require Council members to recuse themselves before voting if they have a 
financial interest in the decision, and if the decision would have a “significant and predictable 
effect on such financial interest.”116  Even after recusal, members may participate in discussions 
regarding the decision and may even mark on the record how they would have voted.
117
  The 
conflict of interest rules that do apply to the Councils are significantly weaker than those that 
generally apply to federal agencies, and thereby threaten objective decision-making.
118
 
b. Ambiguous and Conflicting Provisions  
Although the 1996 amendments reflected a policy shift away from industry and towards 
conservation and ecosystem protection, the MSA now contains ambiguities and conflicting 
provisions that have spurred litigation by both industry and non-governmental groups.  The 
federal court in Massachusetts acknowledged this policy shift in A.M.L. International v. Daley, 
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when the fishing industry‟s challenge to a quota restriction was rejected.119  The fishermen 
claimed that the FMP did not comply with National Standard Eight, which provides that 
“[c]onservation and management measures shall, consistent with the conservation requirements 
of this Act . . . take into account the importance of fishery resources to fishing communities . . . 
[and] minimize adverse economic impacts on such communities.”120  Data indicated that the 
fishery would totally collapse within two to three years unless the FMP was implemented.
121
  
The court held that the economic consequences of a completely collapsed fishery would 
drastically outweigh the short-term economic disadvantages suffered by the fishermen under the 
FMP.
122
 
 National Standard Eight tends to conflict with National Standard One, which states that 
“[c]onservation and management measures shall prevent overfishing.”123  In Natural Resources 
Defense Council v. Daley, the D.C. Circuit reversed a decision by the lower court that a FMP 
with an eighteen percent chance of success was sufficient.
124
  The D.C. Circuit decided that 
National Standard One would be satisfied, however, if council management measures have a 
fifty-one percent chance of preventing overfishing.
125
  In Oceana Inc., v. Evans, the court upheld 
an amendment to the Northeast Multispecies FMP calling for a plan that would reduce 
overfishing gradually in order to phase in stricter fishing limits.
126
  The plaintiffs argued that 
“shall prevent overfishing” means FMPs must end overfishing immediately.127  However, the 
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court found that the plan satisfied the Standard because it sought to end overfishing.
128
  Rather 
than close the stock, the FMP would enable fishermen to stay in business while the fishery 
rebuilds.
129
 
 Not only has the requirement to prevent overfishing fueled debate, but questions have 
also arisen regarding the allowable timeframe Councils have to prevent or end overfishing.  
Section 1854(e)(4) of the MSA requires Councils to rebuild a fishery in a time period “as short 
as possible,” and not exceeding ten years if biologically possible.130  However, the MSA does not 
specify a timeframe when a fishery is not capable of being rebuilt within ten years.
131
  In 
National Resources Defense Council v. National Marine Fisheries Service, the Ninth Circuit 
decided that the MSA gives priority to fisheries conservation rather than the short-term economic 
interests of the fishing industry.
132
  Although the court rejected the Pacific Council‟s plan for 
rebuilding the darkblotched rockfish fishery because it did not satisfy the “as short as possible” 
language, the court likewise rejected the proposition that a stock unable to be rebuilt in ten years 
should automatically close.
133
  Thus, even under the 2006 amendments which call for plans that 
“end overfishing immediately,”134 there is still no clear answer as to the timeframe required for 
fisheries that cannot be rebuilt within a ten-year period. 
In addition to preventing overfishing, another MSA National Standard pertains to bycatch 
reduction.  National Standard Nine requires conservation and management efforts to minimize 
bycatch and the mortality of such bycatch, “to the extent practicable.”135  In Conservation Law 
Foundation v. Evans, the plaintiffs argued that NMFS, in rejecting the closure of four areas to 
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fishing in order to protect essential fish habitat, violated National Standard Nine.
136
  Plaintiffs 
claimed that closure of the four areas would be beneficial to bycatch and essential fish habitiat, 
and therefore, should be implemented.
137
  The court disagreed, finding plaintiff‟s interpretation 
of the provision improperly “equate[d] „practicability‟ with „possibility.‟”138  By using the term 
“practicable,” Congress intended to defer to the Council‟s discretion in deciding how to conserve 
and manage the fishery.
139
  In Pacific Marine Conservation Council v. Evans, rather than defer to 
Council‟s discretion, the Court held that the Council failed to consider “practicable” 
conservation and management alternatives.
140
  By failing to consider an observer program or 
discard caps, the Council did not fully contemplate “practicable” bycatch reduction options.141   
 While several MSA sections have resulted in litigation, National Standard Two has been 
one of the more frequently contested provisions.  National Standard Two mandates 
“[c]onservation and management measures shall be based upon the best scientific information 
available.”142  Since scientific information is often plagued by uncertainty, Council decisions are 
challenged on the basis of inadequate scientific information.  Both Hadaja, Inc. v. Evans
143
 and 
Midwater Trawler Cooperative v. Department of Commerce
144
 indicate that Councils must 
support their conservation, management, and allocation decisions with scientific rationale.  For 
example, “merely stating in conclusory fashion that [a FMP] was considered in light of scientific 
evidence does not bring [a FMP] within the requirements of National Standard Two.”145  As 
                                                 
136
 Conservation Law Found. v. Evans, 360 F.3d 21, 23-24 (1
st
 Cir. 2004). 
137
 Id. at 28. 
138
 Id. 
139
 Id. 
140
 Pac. Marine Conservation Council, Inc. v. Evans, 200 F.Supp.2d 1194, 1203 (N.D.Cal. 2002). 
141
 Id. 
142
 16 U.S.C. § 1851(a)(2) (2007). 
143
 Hadaja, Inc. v. Evans, 263 F.Supp.2d 346 (D.R.I. 2003). 
144
 Midwater Trawlers Co-Op. v. Dep‟t of Commerce, 282 F.3d 710 (9th Cir. 2002). 
145
 Hadaja, 263 F.Supp.2d at 354. 
19 
 
cases are decided, ambiguous and conflicting MSA provisions are gradually addressed but there 
is certainly room for improvement within the Act. 
 c. Looking Ahead 
 Given the rapidly declining state of U.S. fisheries, the need for effective conservation and 
management is more apparent than ever.  Two of the more recent approaches used by Councils 
to protect fisheries are individual transferable quotas (ITQs) and sector management.  ITQ 
systems allocate a share of the total allowable catch to each fisherman and allow fishermen to 
buy or lease ITQs from other fishermen.
146
  One of the problems with this approach is deciding 
which fishermen get an ITQ and how much the total allowable catch will be for the fishery.
147
  
Under a sector management system, which was recently implemented by the New England 
Fishery Management Council, groups of fishermen voluntarily join together as permit holders to 
manage the allocation of fish in their sector.
148
  The fishermen sign a binding contract that 
requires them to stay within the total allowable catch limit for their sector.
149
  Potential problems 
may arise if fishermen are not well organized in monitoring and reporting, if one member of a 
sector exceeds the allocation for the group, or if a species is overfished.
150
 
 Under both ITQ and sector allocation schemes, questions have arisen regarding property 
rights and the public trust interest in fishery resources.  Both systems limit entry into a fishery, so 
fishermen already within the system may continue to catch fish according to the total allowable 
catch but new fishermen may be unable to gain entry.
151
  Since fish have historically been 
considered a public trust asset, one issue is whether ITQs or sectors should be considered 
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property rights.
152
  If they are considered property rights, then do ITQs and sectors amount to a 
constitutional taking of the public trust resources?
153
   
 Another area of uncertainty is how the application of the MSA will confront new 
challenges in the future such as marine spatial planning and the development of offshore energy.  
On July 19, 2010, President Obama signed an Executive Order establishing a National Policy for 
the Stewardship of the Ocean, Coasts, and Great Lakes, which was developed by the Interagency 
Ocean Policy Task Force.
154
  Although NOAA is identified as a member of the task force, NMFS 
is not; this has sparked discussion among Councils that are concerned with participating in the 
development of any Coastal Marine Spatial Plans.
155
  At a Council Coordination Committee 
meeting in May 2010, Council members expressed a desire “to clarify that [Coastal Marine 
Spatial Planning] action [does not] subvert the MSA.”156 
VI. Conclusion 
 Since passage in 1976, the MSA has remained the primary governing law for fisheries 
management in the United States.
157
  While the MSA has been amended over time in response to 
evolving scientific, economic, and social information, new challenges lie ahead for the 
sustainable management of the nation‟s fisheries.  As the demand for fish continues to increase, 
both in the United States and globally, the need to properly manage and protect this valuable 
resource will only become more imminent. 
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